Broussard, David & Moroux

Following a maritime allision involving a crane barge and a bridge in southern Louisiana, Marquette Transportation Company could be facing a class-action lawsuit with punitive damages due to the company’s alleged gross negligence manifested in the frequent and consistent reckless behavior of its employees. Repairs to the bridge are underway, and the costs of said repairs could amount to more than $5 million, a price currently charged to the State of Louisiana. The scope the lawsuit involves compensation for the bridge repairs as well as compensation for the inconveniences caused to the 25,000 local residents who use the bridge on a frequent basis. If the egregious conduct is proven, punitive damages should be awarded to deter those unsafe practices – because running into 32 bridges and merely fixing the damage caused has not been enough deterrence for Marquette Transportation Company to change its ways. The question becomes, “How much in punitive damages is appropriate or necessary in a maritime case like this?”

To answer this question, one can look to two relevant cases. The first is Exxon v. Baker from the year 2008, and the second is Warren v. Shelter Insurance from the year 2017. Following a defense appeal of a punitive-damages award of $5 billion, the Court reduced the award to $2.5 billion so as to be more proportionate to the concurrent compensatory damages awarded. Citing civil code, Exxon states, “An award for punitive damages should be (1) in an amount that will deter the defendant and others from similar conduct, (2) proportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s ability to pay, but (3) not designed to bankrupt or financially destroy a defendant.” The case admits that the notion punitive damages often falls under criticism due to their sheer unpredictability throughout recent history; however, it seeks to find a fair “upper limit” by way of proportions, and it ultimately concludes that a 3:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is an appropriate maximum, though a median ratio of 1:1 ought to be pursued.

Fitting the logic of Exxon, the Warren case issued a punitive-damage award of 2:1 following the violent death of an individual involved in a boating incident. Warren uses the same criteria enumerated in Exxon for determining the amount of punitive damages; however, unique to the case, it adjusts the amount of compensatory damages to form a proper proportion between the two. Repeating the language of Exxon, Warren states that “punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.” An excessive penalty violates the defendant’s due process rights, but a minimal penalty could be ineffective. In this case, the defendant’s penalty was reduced from $23 million to $4.25 but the compensatory damages were raised from $125,000 to $2,125,000, creating the 2:1 ratio.

Following a maritime allision that occurred on October 12, 2018, the Sunshine Bridge, which crosses the Mississippi River in southern Louisiana, has been closed due to structural damage. The repairs to the bridge are underway, but they could last until January or February of 2019, totaling nearly 100 days of non-service to local residents and $5 million dollars of bills to the State of Louisiana. Heavier consequences, however, could befall Marquette Transportation Company, the owner of the at-fault vessel.

In the last five years, Marquette vessels have collided with 32 bridges—roughly 6 collisions per year, or one collision every 2 months. This already staggering statistic becomes even more alarming when paired with the additional fact that Marquette has faced no penalty or fine for any of the incidents. It is for these reasons that the plaintiffs’ attorneys could seek punitive damages against the transportation company. According to the 2008 case Exxon v. Baker, “punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.” They result from “gross negligence,” “willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others,” or “behavior even more deplorable.” The behavior of the ship’s captain is undoubtedly negligent, for he attempted to impossibly pass underneath a bridge with a fully extended crane boom. However, the scope of the dispute at hand regards Marquette Transportation at the corporate level. Thus, one must question if negligence and/or recklessness can be found in the institution.

The Exxon case defines that “Recklessness may consist of either of two different types of conduct. In one, the actor knows, or has reason to know…of facts which create a high degree of risk of…harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk. In the other, the actor has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so.” While no specific act of recklessness (at the corporate level) fitting the definition above has been brought to light, it can and must be argued that the frequency and consistency of maritime allisions involving Marquette vessels is exemplary of an institutional negligence resulting in the poor performance of its employees. In fact, the aforementioned case addresses situations in which no concrete reckless action is detected, saying that “heavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect (increasing chances of getting away with it).” Maritime allisions involving Marquette vessels perhaps do not fall into the category of corporate negligence, but they are certainly evidence of it.

Marquette Transportation Company is facing a potential class-action lawsuit after one of their crane barges struck the Sunshine Bridge in St. James Parish, Louisiana. The boat operator, who is still unnamed, is alleged to have been travelling along the Mississippi River when its crane, extended roughly 100 feet in the air, struck the southeastern side of the bridge. The damages to the bridge could total up to $5 million in repairs.

It is reported that the bridge is used by roughly 20,000 travelers every day. The lack of the bridge causes a detour that could add an additional hour to one’s drive, and the added time results in added financial burdens. Standing in the plaintiffs’ way is the ninety-year-old Robins Dry Dock rule which protects operators from being held liable for tertiary economic damages caused by accidents on the water. Subsequently, some maritime attorneys claim that because the accident occurred on a river and because nearby residents do not own the thing that damaged, the lawsuit applies to the bridge’s repair costs alone.

The negligence of the barge operator is almost undisputed. Rather, the scope of the dispute surrounds the damages for which Marquette can be held responsible. A recent search through a U.S. Coast Guard database shows record of Marquette vessels colliding with bridges 32 times since January 1, 2013; however, the company has neither faced a single penalty for these incidents, nor paid any compensation. In fact, going back further to 2006, there is evidence that another Marquette vessel struck the same bridge (the Sunshine Bridge) causing $2.1 million dollars in damage. In light of this history, the transportation company could be facing a lawsuit for punitive damages, though no injury or death occurred, on the basis of repeated employee wrongdoings as a result of purported negligence at the institutional, corporate level.