Articles Posted in Boating Accidents

ST. MARTINVILLE, LA – November 11, 2019

A Jones Act seaman was injured on January 29, 2016, when his coworker was piloting an Oceaneering survey vessel at high speeds while on his phone and slammed into a piling in the Empire Canal (Plaquemines Parish). The plaintiff was on the back deck of the vessel, an admittedly common practice at Oceaneering at the time, and he was slammed into the cab upon impact injuring his back.

Oceaneering contested liability arguing that the plaintiff should not have been on the back deck of the vessel while traveling at high speeds. Plaintiff successfully recovered under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims based on evidence that the pilot was on the phone, the crew was improperly trained, and that Oceaneering failed to have rules regarding phone use while operating vessels, having a lookout, or passengers working on the back deck while moving.

A Louisiana man is suing a Texas fishing captain following injuries suffered while working on the captain’s vessel. David Robling, the plaintiff, was working aboard the fishing boat, Red Bull, on February 20, 2019, when he suffered injuries resulting from the negligence and unseaworthiness of the ship-captain, Delbert E. Bull, Jr. The suit, filed in the Galveston County District Court, is in accord with the Jones Act, specifically 46 U.S.C. §30104, which protects seamen injured in the course of their employment and which affords them the right to legal action and a trial by jury against the ship’s owner.

According to Robling’s complaint, the ship’s captain, Bull, turned on the boat’s winch without warning the crew. As a result, the boards, nets, and tickler chains were thrown overboard. Without time to react, Robling found himself in the path of the chains, which wrapped around his chest and violently threw him to the deck of the boat. Unable to free himself, Robling was then struck by other falling equipment leading to injuries and mental anguish.

This is not Robling’s first legal encounter with Galveston’s maritime industry. In 2015, Robling filed a complaint against a shipping company after he tripped on equipment that the previous crew had left behind. The fall left Robling with serious and disabling injuries that could have been avoided had the ship’s owner or crew properly maintained the ship and its equipment or warned him of the existing hazards on deck.

The Louisiana Sportsmen Coalition is in a battle with the Louisiana oil industry over rights to use coastal marshwaters for their respective enterprises. Representatives of local fisherman argue that oil companies who own nearby lands have unjustly also claimed ownership of adjacent waters that flow in and out of manmade channels. The sportsmen state that the waters, though very good for fishing, are being treated as off-limits, and the fishermen themselves are being treated as trespassers. Specifically, they say, “It has gotten to the point where [oil companies] are having local law enforcement agencies, like the sheriff’s office and justices of peace, write criminal trespassing tickets to people.”

The conflict came to a head last year when a professional Bassmaster fishing tournament was held in these areas. The world-renowned fishermen, individuals who make a living by these tournaments, unknowingly wandered into “privately owned” waters and were met by authorities. Following the tournament, the Bass Angler Sportsmen Society (B.A.S.S.), the national organization responsible for the well-known Bassmaster tournaments officially announced that it would no longer schedule professional tournaments in Louisiana tidewaters, a decision that will, without doubt, negatively impact the state’s fishing industry. Thus, as the sportsman’s coalition argues, the battle over water access is more than a debate about who can travel where; it is actually a battle over the prioritization of industries, and favor traditionally lies with the oil industry.

Unfortunately for the fishermen, a recently proposed bill that would have granted public access to the marshwater failed in Louisiana’s House of Representatives. The bill argued that because the waters are “running waters”—they freely flow into positively public waterways such as the Gulf of Mexico—they cannot be partitioned as either public or private, and therefore, their default status would be considered public. Opponents of the bill argued that just as one can claim ownership of dry land, one can claim ownership of the bottomlands underneath the water, for coastal erosion is constantly converting dryland into bottomland. The House’s vote reinforces Louisiana’s status as one of the only coastal states that does not consider tidal waters open for public use.

A wrongful death suit has been filed against Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD following a zipline incident wherein a 27-year-old woman was seriously injured and her newlywed husband was killed. The incident occurred as a part of a shore excursion in Roatan during the journey of the Allure of the Seas, though the excursion was operated by an independent contractor, Extreme Caribe Zip Line Tour.

The 24-year-old husband, Igal Tyszman, did not survive his injuries after his wife, Shir Frenkel, became stuck halfway down the zipline, and he had already begun his descent. Tyszman had no way of stopping or slowing down, and he collided with Frenkel in midair. Records indicate that the zip line operators could not communicate to each other when one person had completed their ride and, thus, it was safe for the next person to begin, communication that could have prevented the tragedy.

The suit alleges that Extreme Caribe has a history of zip line incidents, citing more than ten, one of which led to a woman having both of her legs severed, and it asserts that Royal Caribbean was well aware of this and other incidents involving the excursion operator but failed to make those issues known to the participants. Additionally, the cruise ship misled the family to believe that the excursion was operated by the cruise company, itself. The plaintiff’s attorneys state, “These newlyweds were expecting a fun excursion with the highest safety standards, and that is obviously not what they received; and the consequences in this case proved tragic.” In addition to Frenkel’s physical injuries—multiple rib fractures, splenic fracture, multiple transverse fractures, and more—she also will have to undergo treatment for the emotional and mental trauma resulting from her husband’s death.

A maritime allision between a boat and the Sunshine Bridge in Donaldsonville, Louisiana, raises questions as to who may receive compensation under maritime law. The crane barge, operated by an employee of Marquette Transportation Company, caused more than $5 million dollars of damage to the bridge. As a result, the bridge will be closed for nearly four months, and the frequent traversers of it are forced to extend each commute by at least an hour. The inconvenience thrust upon these local residents is tangible, but do they have a legal argument for compensation? Unfortunately, and perhaps unjustly, current maritime case law may not in their favor.

In the case Taira Lynn Marine Limited Number 5 v. Jays Seafood, Inc. et al., the primary issue is whether claimants who suffered no physical damage to a proprietary interest can recover for their economic losses as a result of a maritime allision. The case revolves around a 2001 incident in which a barge allided with a bridge, releasing toxic gasses into the air. As a result, the Louisiana State Police ordered a mandatory evacuation of all businesses and residence within a certain radius of the bridge, including fourteen businesses who made commercial use of the bridge and subsequently suffered economic loss. Though these businesses filed claims for compensation, the court ruled that “there can be no recovery for economic loss absent physical injury to a proprietary interest.”

In the case involving the Sunshine Bridge and Marquette Transportation, it is clear that the State of Louisiana has a right to compensation as the owner of the physically damaged bridge. It seems, however, that according to Taira Lynn that the local residents do not have such a right, though, according to sources, what was once a 90-second drive across the Mississippi River has turned into a 90-minute, 50-mile detour, costing drivers both time and money. In fact, local schools have had to adjust their start times to accommodate students who are simply unable to arrive at such an early hour due to the bridge’s closure. These affected citizens certainly do not have any ownership of the bridge, but in the interest of justice, this should not disqualify them from being compensated for their economic loss.

Following a maritime allision involving a crane barge and a bridge in southern Louisiana, Marquette Transportation Company could be facing a class-action lawsuit with punitive damages due to the company’s alleged gross negligence manifested in the frequent and consistent reckless behavior of its employees. Repairs to the bridge are underway, and the costs of said repairs could amount to more than $5 million, a price currently charged to the State of Louisiana. The scope the lawsuit involves compensation for the bridge repairs as well as compensation for the inconveniences caused to the 25,000 local residents who use the bridge on a frequent basis. If the egregious conduct is proven, punitive damages should be awarded to deter those unsafe practices – because running into 32 bridges and merely fixing the damage caused has not been enough deterrence for Marquette Transportation Company to change its ways. The question becomes, “How much in punitive damages is appropriate or necessary in a maritime case like this?”

To answer this question, one can look to two relevant cases. The first is Exxon v. Baker from the year 2008, and the second is Warren v. Shelter Insurance from the year 2017. Following a defense appeal of a punitive-damages award of $5 billion, the Court reduced the award to $2.5 billion so as to be more proportionate to the concurrent compensatory damages awarded. Citing civil code, Exxon states, “An award for punitive damages should be (1) in an amount that will deter the defendant and others from similar conduct, (2) proportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s ability to pay, but (3) not designed to bankrupt or financially destroy a defendant.” The case admits that the notion punitive damages often falls under criticism due to their sheer unpredictability throughout recent history; however, it seeks to find a fair “upper limit” by way of proportions, and it ultimately concludes that a 3:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is an appropriate maximum, though a median ratio of 1:1 ought to be pursued.

Fitting the logic of Exxon, the Warren case issued a punitive-damage award of 2:1 following the violent death of an individual involved in a boating incident. Warren uses the same criteria enumerated in Exxon for determining the amount of punitive damages; however, unique to the case, it adjusts the amount of compensatory damages to form a proper proportion between the two. Repeating the language of Exxon, Warren states that “punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.” An excessive penalty violates the defendant’s due process rights, but a minimal penalty could be ineffective. In this case, the defendant’s penalty was reduced from $23 million to $4.25 but the compensatory damages were raised from $125,000 to $2,125,000, creating the 2:1 ratio.

Following a maritime allision that occurred on October 12, 2018, the Sunshine Bridge, which crosses the Mississippi River in southern Louisiana, has been closed due to structural damage. The repairs to the bridge are underway, but they could last until January or February of 2019, totaling nearly 100 days of non-service to local residents and $5 million dollars of bills to the State of Louisiana. Heavier consequences, however, could befall Marquette Transportation Company, the owner of the at-fault vessel.

In the last five years, Marquette vessels have collided with 32 bridges—roughly 6 collisions per year, or one collision every 2 months. This already staggering statistic becomes even more alarming when paired with the additional fact that Marquette has faced no penalty or fine for any of the incidents. It is for these reasons that the plaintiffs’ attorneys could seek punitive damages against the transportation company. According to the 2008 case Exxon v. Baker, “punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.” They result from “gross negligence,” “willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others,” or “behavior even more deplorable.” The behavior of the ship’s captain is undoubtedly negligent, for he attempted to impossibly pass underneath a bridge with a fully extended crane boom. However, the scope of the dispute at hand regards Marquette Transportation at the corporate level. Thus, one must question if negligence and/or recklessness can be found in the institution.

The Exxon case defines that “Recklessness may consist of either of two different types of conduct. In one, the actor knows, or has reason to know…of facts which create a high degree of risk of…harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk. In the other, the actor has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so.” While no specific act of recklessness (at the corporate level) fitting the definition above has been brought to light, it can and must be argued that the frequency and consistency of maritime allisions involving Marquette vessels is exemplary of an institutional negligence resulting in the poor performance of its employees. In fact, the aforementioned case addresses situations in which no concrete reckless action is detected, saying that “heavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect (increasing chances of getting away with it).” Maritime allisions involving Marquette vessels perhaps do not fall into the category of corporate negligence, but they are certainly evidence of it.

Marquette Transportation Company is facing a potential class-action lawsuit after one of their crane barges struck the Sunshine Bridge in St. James Parish, Louisiana. The boat operator, who is still unnamed, is alleged to have been travelling along the Mississippi River when its crane, extended roughly 100 feet in the air, struck the southeastern side of the bridge. The damages to the bridge could total up to $5 million in repairs.

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It is reported that the bridge is used by roughly 20,000 travelers every day. The lack of the bridge causes a detour that could add an additional hour to one’s drive, and the added time results in added financial burdens. Standing in the plaintiffs’ way is the ninety-year-old Robins Dry Dock rule which protects operators from being held liable for tertiary economic damages caused by accidents on the water. Subsequently, some maritime attorneys claim that because the accident occurred on a river and because nearby residents do not own the thing that damaged, the lawsuit applies to the bridge’s repair costs alone.

The negligence of the barge operator is almost undisputed. Rather, the scope of the dispute surrounds the damages for which Marquette can be held responsible. A recent search through a U.S. Coast Guard database shows record of Marquette vessels colliding with bridges 32 times since January 1, 2013; however, the company has neither faced a single penalty for these incidents, nor paid any compensation. In fact, going back further to 2006, there is evidence that another Marquette vessel struck the same bridge (the Sunshine Bridge) causing $2.1 million dollars in damage. In light of this history, the transportation company could be facing a lawsuit for punitive damages, though no injury or death occurred, on the basis of repeated employee wrongdoings as a result of purported negligence at the institutional, corporate level.

Tia Coleman is calling the defense of Branson Duck Vehicles and Ripley Entertainment “callous and calculated” following a duck boat accident on July 19, 2018. Nine of Coleman’s family members and eight others were killed when the amphibious boat capsized during a storm. Ten days later, Coleman and her attorneys filed a $100 million wrongful death suit against the two companies, but the defendants have cited an 1851 law known as the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act.

According to the law, a shipowner may limit damage claims following an accident to the value of the vessel and any pending freight so long as he can prove that he lacked knowledge of the vessel’s problem beforehand. Because the duck boat in question was a total loss with no value following the accident and there was no pending freight, Ripley and Branson’s attorneys are claiming zero liability. Needless to say, the 167-year-old law was originally written for a different purpose. At the time, maritime insurance did not exist. Thus, in creating the law, Congress hoped to encourage vessel purchases and maritime transport by guaranteeing protection for sea-vessel owners in case of an accident.

Following a Coast Guard investigation of the accident, probable cause of negligence was found on the part of the boat’s captain, though the defense contests this finding. On the basis of the finding, Coleman and her attorneys filed an additional federal lawsuit in September against the boat’s operator and manufacturer. “This tragedy was the predictable and predicated result of decades of unacceptable, greed-driven and will ignorance of safety by the boat industry,” the suit states. If such an argument holds and the accident is proven to have been the “predictable” result of “willful ignorance”, it is possible that the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act will be deemed inapplicable in this particular case.

An interesting case recently arose out of the Northern District of California. A ferry boat captain was found partially responsible for a collision in which he was using his cell phone in the minutes before his boat wrecked into a speedboat on the San Francisco Bay.

In February of 2013, Harry Holzhauer and David Rhoades were traveling by speedboat in the San Francisco Bay when a ferry crashed into their boat. The driver, Holzhauer, was killed in the collision and Rhoades, who owned the boat, was seriously injured. The widows of Holzhauer and Rhoades both filed claims against the ferry captain and the ferry owner, alleging the captain negligently used his cell phone immediately before the accident occurred.  At the trial, Plaintiffs presented evidence that showed that the ferry made a course and speed change about two minutes before the collision and that the captain of the ferry made a two-minute cell phone call at 4:07 pm, just before the 4:09 pm collision.

After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $5,276,306, broken down as $3,729,559 to Rhoades and $1,546,747 to Holzhauer. Further, the jury found the ferry Captain to be 30% at fault and Holtzhauer 70% at fault, reducing Holtzhauer’s award to $464,024.00.

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